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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs.-

Case No.
. 12284

THOMAS DEVON GEE,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Thomas Devon Gee, appeals his jury
conviction of First Degree Murder in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, St.ate of Utah,
the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins, Judge, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Thomas Devon Gee, appellant, was charged with First
Degree Murder in violation of Sec. 76-30-1, Utah Code
Ann. (1953} and tried before a jury in the Third Judicial
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, Judge
D. Frank Wilkins, presiding. Appellant was convicted
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of the charge and was seatcnced to a term of Efe imprirnnmen at hard labor. Presiding Judge, D. Frank Wilkins,
signed a certificate of probable cause for appeal on July
20, 1970.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent respectfuily submits that the judgment
of the lower court be affirmed.
Respondent accepts appellant's statement of facts,
but for the sake of clarity would respectfully add the
following:
Marilyn Peterson, the mother of the deceased child,
Craig, first became acquainted with appellant no more
than a month before October 5, 1969, the date of the fatal
injuries. (R. 129). Subsequent to meeting appellant,
Marilyn Peterson moved to a new location.. Appellant was
living with her and the deceased as of October 5, 1969.
(R. 128-9). The evidence presented is void of any suspect
injuries suffered by the deceased prior to Marilyn Peterson's acquaintance with appellant. The deceased was examined by Dr. Nicholson on September 8, 1969, and
nothing unusual was noted. (R. 279) . The well defined
circular burn on deceased's foot was treated at the hospital
on September 17, 1969 (R. 259). A cigarette lighter from
appellant's automobile was entered into evidence as the
kind of object that could cause such a clean burn.
The next injuries suffered by deceased were treated
at the hospital on September 26, 1969. These injuries
consisted of blistered toes from putting deceased's feet in

hot water. (R. 139-ln). Additionally, the deceased suffered large bruises on the back of his legs while in appellant's care, several days prior to September 26th. (R 135137). Also, deceased suffered a loss of his front tooth, in
the middle of September, while again in appellant's care.
Craig Peterson, the deceased, was hospitalized from September 26th until about October 1, 1969. On October 5th
while in appellant's care, Craig Peterson suffered injuries
in the form of trauma to the head that resulted in death
from a subdural hematoma. (R. 298-303).
On the night of the fatal injuries, while deceased was
in the care of the appellant and while Marilyn Peterson
was absent from the apartment, Margie Williams, a witness, visited the apartment where appellant was watching
the deceased. She testified that she saw appellant carrying deceased down the stairs by his ears and that appellant
slapped deceased and hit his head against the stair railing.
CR 324, R. 223).
Deceased was taken to the hospital shortly after his
mother returned home. Craig Peterson died October 7,
1969.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER.
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The record clearly indicates that the appellant inflicted numerous injuries upon deceased within a very
short time span of several weeks. In addition, testimony
at trial by Margie Williams, testimony believed by the
jury, very adequately indicates a deliberate and intentional malice on the part of appellant in inflicting very serious
injuries on the deceased. The eye-witness testimony
coupled with the prior infliction of serious injury can
reasonably indicate premeditation and malice aforethought on the part of appellant.
Margie Williams testified as follows:
"DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR BANKS:
Q.

Now, with reference to the night that the baby
was talwn to the hospital, when you walked
around to the window, did you tell us everything that you saw or heard that night?

A.

No.

Q.

And can you tell us why you did not tell us
everything?

A.

Because my kids have been threatened.

Q.

By whom?

A.

Devon.

Q.

And when did he threaten your children?

A.

That night.

Q.

All right. From the time you parked the car
tell us again what you did?

A.

I knocked on the back door and I couldn't
get any answer, and I heard Craig crying,
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'Don't, it hurts.' And so I went around to the
side window thinking no one was there, that
they had left him alone. At that time Devon
was coming down the stairs holding the child's
ears. When he came down the stairs, he slapped him across the face, and then took his head
and hit him against the stair railing.

Q.

What occurred after that?

A.

I tried to get his attention. I knocked on the
window. I thought that I was going to break
it, and he seen me. He finally seen me. He
told me if I said anything, he would kill my
kids.

Q. And what did you do then?
A.

I went home."
(R. 323-324)

Utah Code Ann. (1953) sets forth the definition of malice that is required for the crime of murder. It
states:
"Such malice may be express or implied. It
is express when there is manifested a deliberate
intention unlawfully to take the life of a fellow
creature. It is implied when no considerable pro-

vation appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant
heart." (Emphasis added)

The evidence in this case clearly shows, from the
severity and nature of the injuries inflicted, that the requisite intent and malice was present in the mind of appellant.
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To constitute the cnme oI First Degree l\1urdei' a
showing of of "wilful, deliberate, malicious and pre-meditated'' killing is necessary. (§76-30-3, Utah Code Ann.
(1953). The claim by appellant that no such showing was
made by the evidence is without merit. Only enough time
to reflect and consider the matter is required. See State
v. Warwick, 11 U.2d 116, 355 P.2d 703 (1960), State v.
Schad, 24 U.2d 255, 470 P.2d 246 (1970), and State v.
Neal, 123 Utah 93, 254 P.2d 1053 (1953).
Further, the infliction of great bodily harm upon the
person of the deceased child can reasonably be calculated
to result in the death of the child. The testimony of Margie Williams, cited supra, abundantly indicates appellant's
wilful and deliberate infliction of great bodily harm on
the deceased. See State v. Russell, 106 Utah 116, 145 P.
2d 1003 (1944).
Appelllant further argues that this is not a proper
case for application of
Utah Code Ann. (1953)
wherein it states:
" ... or perpetrated by any act greatly dangerous to the lives of others and evidencing a depraved
mind, regardless of human life; ... "
Admittedly, the usual application of this provision
involves the situation where one perpetrates an act greatly
dangerous to the lives of others, indiscriminately. However, where the act evidences a depraved mind and commission of an act greatly dangerous to the person of another, as in the instant case, provision should be made for
such conduct to fall within the statute. Specifically, in the
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cas·J, supra, this court affinned a second degree
felony murder conviction where the deceased died from a
tightly bound neck while perfonning a mutual act of
sodomy. The court said:

"It is so obvious as not to require eludication
that the act of sodomy committed in the manner
shown here, with the deceased so .bound that he
choked to death, was an act greatly dangerous to
the lives of others and evidencing a depraved mind,
regardless of human life." (Emphasis added.)
Thus, sufficient evidence was presented at trial to
show that appellant wilfully and intentionally inflicted
great bodily hann upon the infant deceased, which injury
was reasonably calculated b cause death and that appellant evidenced a depraved mind in committing such injuries.
POINT II
APPELLANT WAS IN NO WAY PREJUDICED AT
TRIAL BY THE ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE OF
COLORED PHOTOGRAPHS OF DECEASED.

A quick look at the photographs admitted into evidence sufficiently indicates that there was no prejudice
nor inflammatory value derived therefrom.
In the first instance, admission of photographs into
evidence is properly within the sound discretion of the
trial court and the reviewing court should only interfere
when manifest error is shown. In State v. Renzo, 21 U.2d
205, 443 P. 2d 392 (1968), this court stated at 399:
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"The fact that a picture may be gruesome is no
reason for excluding it from evidence if it is otherwise competent and relevant. It is a matter of discretion with the trial judge to determine whether
the probative value of the picture outweie-hs the
possible adverse effect which might be produced
upon being shown to the jury. 23 C.J.S. Criminal
( 1) c. This discretion on the part of a
Law
trial judge to admit or reject evidence should not
be interferred with by an appellate court unless
manifest error is shown."
See also State u. Johnson, 25 Utah 2d 46, 475 P. 2d
543 1970; State u. Jachson, 22 Utah 2d 408, 454 P.2d 290
(1969); and State u. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 P. 2d 512
(1968).
Clearly, a proper determination of the elements of
the crime had to be decided by the jury.
The admission of photographs of the deceased's injuries gave probative value to the other testimony and
evidence presented at trial. No inflammatory nor gruesome nature attended the photographs. Respondent submits, therefore, that no err be assigned for the reason that
these photographs were admitted into evidence.
POINT III
NO ADDITIONAL CORROBORATING EVIDENCE WAS
REQUIRED TO CONVICT APPELLANT AND THE STATE
WITNESSES, MARILYN PETERSON AND MARGIE WILLIAMS, WERE NOT ACCOMPLICES.

A review of the record manifestly shows that Marilyn
was never in the presE:nce
Peter:::on, the deceased's

of the child when the injuries were inflicted. Moreover,
each time an injury was brought to her attention, she
made almost irmnediate arrangements to have the child
treated by competent medical help at a hospital. Certainly
this conduct is not that of an accomplice to the crime of
murder.
Appellant fails to point out specific conduct that
would qualify either Marilyn Peterson or Margie Williams
as accomplices and therefore subject them to treatment
as principles in the crime of murder as
Utah
Code Ann. (1953) would require.
On October 5, 1969, the date of the fatal injuries, appellant was solely in the care of deceased.
Neither Marilyn Peterson nor Margie Williams have
in any way been shown to "aid and abet" or to "have advised and encouraged" the commission of the fatal injuries
upon Craig Peterson.
Respondent submits, then, that since the state's
witnesses are not in fact, or in law, accomplices, that no
corroborating evidence is required to prove the guilt of
appellant.
POINT IV
A JUROR MAY NOT IMPEACH HIS OWN VERDICT
AND THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO SHOW THAT THE JURY CONDUCT WAS
IN FACT IMPROPER AND PREJUDICIAL.

It is the law of this jurisdiction that a juror may not
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impeach hi3 own verdict. State v. Priestly, 97 Utah 158,
91 P. 2d 447 (1939) and State v. Rivenburgh, 11 Utah 2d
95, 355 P. 2d 689 (1960).
In the P,-icstly case, all eight of the jurors signed affidavits to the effect that the verdict of guilty was a
compromise in that no agreement was reached until
all jurors agreed to recommend leniency, thereby believing that a fine instead of a prison sentence would be imposed on defendant.

The court affinned the conviction and stated at 449:

"It is the settled law in this jurisdiction that
jurors cannot impeach their verclict except in the
instances expressly made exceptions by legislative
enactment."
For cases holding a juror may not impeach his own
verdict in circumstances sin1ilar to the facts in the instant
case see, State v. Bedwell, 77 Idaho 57, 286 P.2d 641
(1955), and State v. Hockett, 172 Kansas 1, 238 P.2d 539
(1952).
The applicable statutory grounds for a new trial are
enumerated in
'77-38-3, Utah Code Ann. (1953). The
statute provides:
"77-38-3. Grounds-When a verdict or decision has been rendered against the defendant, the
court may, upon his application, grant a new trial
in the following cases only:
(3) Yvhen the jury have separated without leave
of the court after retiring to deliberate upon their
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verdict, or have been guilty of any misconduct by
which a fair and due consideration of the cause
may have been prevented.
(4) When the verdict has been determined by
lot or by any means other than a fair expression
of opinion on the part of all the jurors.
(5) When the court has misdirected the jury in
a matter of law, or has erred in the decision of any
question of law arising during the coure of the
trial, or has done or allowed any act in the cause
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendant.
(6) When the verdict or decision is contrary to
law or the evidence.... " (Emphasis added.)
Here the jury was specifically instructed to disregard
defendant's failure to testify in the case. Instruction 22
provided in pertinent part:

"

So, in this case the mere fact that this defendant has not availed himself of the privilege which
the law gives him should not prejudice him in any
way. It should not be considered as any indication
either of his guilt or of his innocence. The failure of
the defendant to testify is not even a circumstance
against him and no presumption of guilt can be
indulged in the minds of the jury by reason of such
failure on his part."

Thus, the jury was adequately instructed on this
matter. It should be assumed that the jury properly upheld their oath as a juror to be impartial and apply the law
as the court directs.
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The court in State v. Athorn, 46 N.J. 247, 216 A.2d
369 ( 1966) , very ably discusses the issue before this court.
It says,
"If verdicts could be easily set aside as a result of an investigation into secret jury deliberations, disappointed litigants would be encouraged
to tamper with jurors, to harrass them and to employ fraudulent practices in an effort to induce
them to repudiate their decisions. Moreover, an
open invitation would be extended to any disgruntled juror who might choose to destroy a verdict to which he had previously assented.

The secrecy surrounding jury deliberations
is necessary not only to prevent the unsettling of
verdicts after they have been recorded, but also as
an aid to the deliberative process itself. Each juror
should be encouraged to state his thoughts freely,
good or bad, ::;o that they may be weighed by the
other jurors." (Emphasis added.)
Therefore, only in the most compelling circwnstances,
involving the substantial rights of the defendant, should
a juror be allowed to impeach his own verdict. In the
instant case the tec-.timony of the juror, Donna Johnson, is
somewhat contradictory.
She states:

"BY MR. BANKS:
Q.

Of course, when you say this was considered
by other members of the jury, there was just
conversation in the jury room, is that correct?

A.

Yes.
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Q.

So that you don't know whether or not they
took this into consideration within their own
minds in determining his guilt or innocence?

A.

vVell, I know how they-mosL of them t.alked
in the jury room to each other, and-

Q.

But what I mean, that it's your conclusion
based on what was said, is that correct, in the
jury room?

A.

Yes.

MR. BANKS: That's all. Oh! one other thing.
Q.

(By Mr. Banks.) Excluding your consideration of his not taking the stand, it was, was it
not, that based on the other evidence that was
presented, it wag your conclusion that he did
commit this crime?

MR. RUSSELL: I would object to the question.
THE COURT: Overruled.
MR. BANKS: Did you understand my question?
THE WITNESS: No, I'm not sure I did. Would
you repeat it, please?
Q.

(By Mr. Banks) All of the other evidence
that was presented to the court and jury,
based on that, it was your conclusion that he
did commit this crime; isn't that correct?

A.

Yes. To begin with-

MR. BANKS:

That's all."

Thus, even taking the jurors' own testimony, the fact
that defendant did not testify is not clearly the grounds
for his conviction. The most that can be assumed is that

,.
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this juror, considered the issue and that the other jurors
mentioned it.
Upon these facts, no error has been shown sufficient
to justify a new trial or to indicate that appellant was
prejudiced thereby. No error should be found and no basis
is provided for a finding that the conduct falls within the
legislative exceptions of §77-38-3, Utah Code Ann. (1953).
Furthermore, any cumulative effect of non-prejudicial
error as may be found in the circumstances of the instant
case would not warrant a reversal and remand for a new
trial.
CONCLUSION
Respondent submits, that based upon the argument
and authority provided herein, this court should affirm appellant's conviction.
VERNON S. ROMNEY
Attorney General
DAVID S. YOUNG
Chief Asst. Attroney General
LARRY V. LUNT
Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

